The UML-Maoist Center coalition collapsed just two months after its formation, in yet another case of the unusually rapid government shake-up that has been a hallmark of Nepal since 1990. Frequent changes of governments and ministers take a toll on the bureaucracy. But how exactly? How does a bureaucrat deal with such changes? And what are the impacts of such policy changes? The Publications Prithivi Man Shrestha talks to architect and former government secretary Kishore Thapa. After an illustrious career as a career bureaucrat, Thapa made a foray into politics through the erstwhile Sajha Party when he contested the Kathmandu mayoral election in 2017 excerpts:
How do you rate the impact of politics on Nepal’s governance and development over the years?
Nepal has a long history of political instability. After the political change in 1990, Nepali initiated many reforms and the country’s economy also did better in the early 1990s under the Nepali Congress government. After the 1994 elections, which led to a deadlocked parliament, the country began to see frequent changes of government. Since then, much of the national energy has been expended in political administration.
Political parties failed to deliver on their own election manifestos when in power. I have not seen any minister trying to implement election manifestos of their own parties. The election manifesto was supposed to be a guiding document to fulfill the promises made to the people before the elections. Since 1994, the country has seen many coalition governments. Such governments are governed on the basis of the Common Minimum Program (CMP). I didn’t find any involved with CMP.
With frequent changes of government, there was also no political stability. Even within the same government, there are examples of policy inconsistency when a minister is changed. This created anarchy in governance. So our planning and programming as well as execution of the construction work suffered.
Could you give examples of political instability leading to political instability?
For example, in 2006, the concept of the Kathmandu Valley Outer Ring Road was introduced. I was the first director of this project, I worked on it for two years. This was one of the main priorities of the interim government after the success of the people’s movement in 2006. But the governments formed later did not prioritize this project. If the country needed it, successive governments should have given it continuity. In the case of the Kathmandu-Tarai Expressway, its implementation modality has changed over time depending on which government is in power. Some governments wanted it to be implemented through a public-private partnership, while others wanted the Ministry of Roads to implement it. Its construction was then later handed over to the Nepal Army.
You saw how the construction license to develop the Budhi Gandaki hydropower project was given to a Chinese company and the next government grabbed the license. How can a project move forward with such inconsistency in policy? Given its unstable politics and unreliable rulers, who will risk investing in Nepal?
National pride projects are prioritized by all political parties. But they also face time and cost overruns. Who is responsible?
On paper, these are high priority projects. But they do not have priority in the true sense of the word. It was found that only the ministry under which a project of national pride falls gives priority to the project while other ministries are not so enthusiastic to help with the implementation of the project. Despite high-priority projects, government officials and contractors show no commitment to developing these projects.
When you declare a particular project as a ‘project of national pride’, all stakeholders must give it special treatment. For example, the procedures for implementing such projects should be shortened. The only special treatment the government has given to national pride projects is that they do not face a resource deficit. This is not enough. Like other projects, national pride projects face problems such as difficulties in land acquisition and deforestation.
Based on your experience, how does the bureaucracy deal with frequent changes of government?
The difficulty for government officials is that when a new government is formed, it can take up to a month to inform the minister about the activities of the respective ministry depending on the scope of the ministry’s tasks. While the bureaucratic machine spends time in briefing, it cannot devote enough time to implement development projects. And the minister is gone six months after the briefing. Another minister is appointed and the same briefing cycle continues. I have found that no new minister comes mentally prepared for the job. Some ministers engage in activities such as cutting off electricity to offices that do not pay bills, which are supposed to be carried out by lower-ranking civil servants.
Ministers always blame the non-cooperation of the bureaucracy for their own failure. How do you see it?
It does not befit a minister to complain about lack of cooperation from the bureaucracy. Cooperation also depends on the minister’s ability to control the bureaucratic machinery. There is also a tendency in the bureaucracy not to follow a minister when they know the minister will be gone soon.
How do frequent changes of government affect governance?
When their expected tenure in government is short, politicians tend to quickly extract as much personal gain as possible. Ministers bring in bureaucrats to help serve their self-interest. If a minister wants to secure certain benefits from a private enterprise, such an elected bureaucrat helps him prepare a policy that will benefit the enterprise. When the minister has a vested interest, the bureaucrat also seeks to benefit himself personally to serve the minister’s interest.
Another trend is for ministers to appoint their own cadres in state structures to serve their personal or party interests. The new minister did not retain the existing secretary, even though the secretary had previously signed a performance contract with the previous minister. A secretary signs such a contract for one year, after which there is an assessment. But the new minister moves the secretary elsewhere to bring in a new one. The new minister not honoring the performance contract the secretary signed with the previous minister created anarchy in governance. We cannot expect desired results in such an environment of anarchy.
How do politically connected government personnel hinder governance?
Bureaucrats associated with certain political parties are the biggest obstacle to good governance. Government cannot function well when the bureaucracy is divided along party lines. The Civil Service Act says there should be only one union of civil servants representing bureaucrats. But there are parallel employee unions affiliated with different parties. They get a salary from people’s taxes, but they work in the interest of certain political parties. We cannot expect a civil servant affiliated with a political party to follow the instructions of a minister of another party. I have also seen civil servants work for a particular political faction of a party instead of the whole party.